
























We discuss a matrix public key cryptosystem and its numerical implementation.
1 Introduction
In a symmetrical key cryptosystem, such as AES (Advanced Encryption Standard), two users Alice
and Bob must first agree on a common secret key [1]. If Alice communicates the secret key to
Bob, a third party, Eve, might intercept the key, and decrypt the messages. In order to avoid such
a situation one can use an asymmetric public key cryptosystem, which provides a mechanism to
securely exchange information via open networks [1].
In public key cryptography a user has a pair of cryptographic keys, consisting on a widely
distributed public key and a secret private key. These keys are related through a hard mathematical
inversion problem, such that the private key cannot be practically derived from the public key.
The two main directions of public key cryptography are the public key encryption and the digital
signatures. Public key encryption is used to ensure confidentiality. In this case, the data encrypted
with the public key can only be decrypted with the corresponding private key. Digital signatures
are used to ensure authenticity or prevent repudiation. In this case, any message signed with a
user’s private key can be verified by anyone who has access to the user’s public key, proving the
authenticity of the message.
A standard implementation of public key cryptography is based on the Diffie-Hellman (DH) key
agreement protocol [2]. The protocol allows two users to exchange a secret key over an insecure
communication channel. The platform of the DH protocol is the multiplicative group Zp of integers
modulo a prime p. The DH protocol can be described as following:
1. Alice and Bob agree upon the public integer g ∈ Zp.
2. Alice chooses the secret integer a.
3. Alice computes A = ga mod p, and publishes A.
4. Bob chooses the secret integer b.
5. Bob computes B = gb mod p, and publishes B.
6. Alice computes the secret integer KA = B
amod p = gba mod p.
7. Bob computes the secret integer KB = A
b mod p = gab mod p.
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It is obvious that both Alice and Bob calculate the same integer K ≡ KA = KB , which then can
be used as a secret shared key for symmetric encryption.
Assuming that the eavesdropper Eve knows p, g,A and B, she needs to compute the secret key
K, that is to solve the discrete logarithm problem:
A = ga mod p, (1)
for the unknown a. If p is a very large prime of at least 300 digits, and a and b are at least 100
digits long, then the problem becomes computationally hard (exponential time in log p), and it
is considered infeasible. For maximum security it is also recommended that p is a safeprime, i.e.
(p− 1)/2 is also a prime, and g is a primitive root of p. This protocol is secure, assuming that it is
infeasible to factor a large integer composed of two or more large prime factors.
Here, we discuss a public key cryptosystem, which extends the key exchange to a matrix proto-
col, and avoids the traditional number theory approach based on the discrete logarithm problem.
The key exchange mechanism is based on a commutative function defined as the product of two
matrix polynomials. We provide a detailed description of this encoding mechanism, and a practical
numerical implementation.
2 Commutativity of Matrix Polynomials
Let us consider the complex matrix X ∈ CN×N , and two complex matrix polynomials of the form:
P (X, a) : CN×N × CM → CN×N , (2)






P (X, b) : CN×N × CK → CN×N , (4)





where a ∈ CM and b ∈ CK .
One can easily show that the product of these polynomials is commutative:
































= P (X, b)P (X, a). (6)
However, because the matrix product is non-commutative, we also have:
P (X, a)P (Y, b) 6= P (Y, b)P (X, a), (7)
if X 6= Y ∈ CN×N and a ∈ CM , b ∈ CK .
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3 Key Exchange Protocol
Using the above property, the proposed key exchange protocol can be formulated as following:
1. Alice chooses the secret vectors a ∈ CM1 and a˜ ∈ CM2 (Alice’s private key).
2. Alice randomly generates and publishes the matrix U ∈ CN×N (Alice’s matrix public key).
3. Bob chooses the secret vectors b ∈ CJ1 and b˜ ∈ CJ2 (Bob’s private key).
4. Bob randomly generates and publishes the matrix V ∈ CN×N (Bob’s matrix public key).
5. Alice computes and publishes the matrix A = P (U, a)P (V, a˜) (Alice’s public key).
6. Bob computes and publishes the matrix B = P (U, b)P (V, b˜) (Bob’s public key).
7. Alice calculates the secret matrix Sa = P (U, a)BP (V, a˜) (Alice’s secret key).
8. Bob calculates the secret matrix Sb = P (U, b)AP (V, b˜) (Bob’s secret key).
One can see that both Alice and Bob obtain the same secret key S ≡ Sa = Sb, since the matrix
polynomials satisfy the commutativity property. Also we assume that we always have U 6= V .
Assuming that the eavesdropper Eve knows U, V and A,B, the hard problem is to compute S,
which requires the unknown private key vectors a, a˜ or b, b˜. We should note that the number of
elements (M1, M2, J1, J2) in these vectors is also unknown.












Thus, we obtain a system of equations,Ψα = A, with the unknown αk = ama˜n, k ≡ (m,n). The
columns of the matrix Ψ, Ψ(k) = UmV n, and the matrix A are written as vectors by stacking
their constituent columns. In total there are K = M1M2 columns in Ψ, and each column has N
2
elements. Therefore, the resulted system is badly underdermined if M1,M2 ≫ N . Thus, we should
consider that M1,M2, J1, J2 ≫ N , in order to increase the security.
4 Practical Implementation Aspects
The goal of this section is to discuss some practical aspects regarding the numerical implementation
of the proposed matrix public key cryptosystem. We choose the C language for implementation, and
the standard GCC compiler on a desktop running Ubuntu 14.04 LTS. We focus only on building a
simulation environment, where we can test the functionality of the algorithms. The code is listed
in the Appendix 1, and here we provide a detailed discussion of its main components. The required
compilation and run steps are:
gcc -O3 -lm keys.c -o keys
./keys > results.txt
The program starts by setting the size of the required square matrices. We choose the size value
N = 4, which means that all the matrices will contain NN = N*N = 16 double precision complex
numbers. This value of N is enough to obtain a secret key with the length K = NN*8 = 128 bytes.
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Since this is a simulation only, we choose also to use the standard random number generator from
C, rand(), in order to initialize the variables in the problem. Of course in a real application rand()
is a poor choice, and should be avoided, however our goal here is to simply show that the proposed
algorithm works. For a secure implementation one can use successive applications of secure hash
functions (sha256), or secure ciphers (AES), to generate the required pseudo-random numbers.
The private keys, a, a˜, b, b˜, are stored in the byte arrays a, aa, b, bb, and they are generated
with the private_key(...) function. The private keys are stored as byte arrays of length M1*16,
M2*16, J1*16, J2*16. Longer private keys will provide a better security. For simulation purposes,
the M1, M2, J1, J2 values are randomly generated in the range [NN, 2*NN-1], such that the condition
M1,M2, J1, J2 ≫ N is marginally satisfied (one can make them much longer if necessary).
Each double precision complex number needs 16 bytes to store it. The real and imaginary
part of the complex numbers are generated with the drand() function. This function is designed
to generate “dense” double precision random numbers in the (0, 1) interval. For each decimal in
the mantissa, we use a separate rand() call, until the precision gets below 2 · 10−16, which is the
machine epsilon for double precision numbers.
The matrix public keys, U and V , are stored in the byte arrays U and V, and are generated with
the matrix_public_key(...) function. Each array holds NN double precision complex numbers in
NN*16 bytes, using the same approach described above for the private_key(...) function.
The public keys, A and B, are stored in the byte arrays A and B, and are generated with the
public_key(...) function. Since these are also double precision complex matrices with the size
NN, they will need NN*16 bytes of storage.
The power matrices Um are also normalized as following:
‖Um‖−1F U
m ← Um, (9)
where ‖.‖F is the Frobenius norm. Thus, all the polynomials are rewritten as:






This way, the elements of the power matrices will be in the same “range”, while the polynomial
commuting properties described before are preserved. Also, since the order U , V or V , U cannot
be specified exactly, we made the convention that if the first element of U is smaller than the first
element of V , then the order U , V is switched to V , U . This makes irrelevant the order in which
the arguments, U and V , are passed to the functions.
The secret keys, Sa and Sb, are stored in the byte arrays Sa and Sb with a length K = NN*4,
and they are computed with the secret_key(...) function. The secret keys are extracted from
the matrices Sa and Sb, each containing NN elements. The computation of these matrices is affected
by rounding errors, due to the finite floating point number representation, and inherently will lead
to Sa 6= Sb, which of course is undesirable. In order to counter the accumulation of the floating
point rounding errors, we extract the significand of each double precision number, and from the
significand we extract a 4 byte unsigned integer (see the code for more details). Thus, from each
double precision complex number we extract two unsigned integers in the range [0, 232 − 1]. The
128 bytes corresponding to these 32 integers form the secret keys, and are stored into the byte
arrays Sa and Sb.
For illustration purposes, the results obtained for one instance run are given in Appendix 2. One
can see that both Alice and Bob compute the same secret key (Sa = Sb), using completely different
secret and public keys.
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5 Conclusion
In conclusion, we have presented a matrix public key cryptosystem, which avoids the cumbersome
key generation of the traditional number theory approach. The key exchange mechanism is ensured
by the commutative property of the product of two matrix polynomials. Also, we have provided a
detailed description of this encoding mechanism, and a practical numerical implementation.
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Appendix 1
Below we give the C code of the proposed key exchange protocol.
//------------------------------------------------------
// keys.c, C implementation of the key exchange protocol








double d = 0.0;
double s = 1.0;
do{
s /= RAND_MAX + 1.0;




void cprod(unsigned N, double complex *X,
double complex *Y, double complex *R){











double fnorm(unsigned N, double complex *x){








void secret_key(unsigned M1, unsigned M2 ,
unsigned N, unsigned K,
unsigned char *a, unsigned char *aa ,
unsigned char *U, unsigned char *V,
unsigned char *B, unsigned char *S){
unsigned m, n, i, j, NN = N*N;
double complex *u = calloc(NN, sizeof(double complex));
double complex *v = calloc(NN, sizeof(double complex));
double complex *pu = malloc(NN*sizeof(double complex));
double complex *pv = malloc(NN*sizeof(double complex));
if(U[0] >= V[0]){
for(n=0; n<NN; n++){
unsigned char* x = malloc (16);
for(m=0; m <16; m++) x[m] = U[n*16+m];
pu[n] = u[n] = *(double complex*)x;
}
for(n=0; n<NN; n++){
unsigned char* x = malloc (16);
for(m=0; m <16; m++) x[m] = V[n*16+m];





unsigned char* x = malloc (16);
for(m=0; m <16; m++) x[m] = V[n*16+m];
pu[n] = u[n] = *(double complex*)x;
}
for(n=0; n<NN; n++){
unsigned char* x = malloc (16);
for(m=0; m <16; m++) x[m] = U[n*16+m];
pv[n] = v[n] = *(double complex*)x;
}
}
double complex *c = calloc(M1, sizeof(double complex));
for(n=0; n<M1; n++){
unsigned char* x = malloc (16);
for(m=0; m<16; m++) x[m] = a[n*16+m];
c[n] = *(double complex*)x;
}
double complex *cc = calloc(M2 , sizeof(double complex));
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for(n=0; n<M2; n++){
unsigned char* x = malloc (16);
for(m=0; m<16; m++) x[m] = aa[n*16+m];
cc[n] = *( double complex*)x;
}
double complex *uu = calloc(NN , sizeof(double complex));
double complex *vv = calloc(NN , sizeof(double complex));
double complex *r = calloc(NN, sizeof(double complex));
for(m=0; m<M1; m++){
double norm = fnorm(NN , pu);
for(n=0; n<NN; n++) uu[n] += c[m]*pu[n]/norm;
cprod(N, pu , u, r);
for(n=0; n<NN; n++) pu[n] = r[n];
}
for(m=0; m<M2; m++){
double norm = fnorm(NN , pv);
for(n=0; n<NN; n++) vv[n] += cc[m]*pv[n]/norm;
cprod(N, pv , v, r);
for(n=0; n<NN; n++) pv[n] = r[n];
}
double complex *b = calloc(NN, sizeof(double complex));
for(n=0; n<NN; n++){
unsigned char* x = malloc (16);
for(m=0; m<16; m++) x[m] = B[n*16+m];
b[n] = *(double complex*)x;
}
cprod(N, uu, b, pu);
cprod(N, pu, vv, r);
for(n=0; n<NN; n++){
double x = significand(creal(r[n]));
if(x > 0) x = x - 1; else x = x + 2;
unsigned fr = (unsigned)(x*4294967295);
double y = significand(cimag(r[n]));
if(y > 0) y = y - 1; else y = y + 2;
unsigned fi = (unsigned)(y*4294967295);
unsigned char* rr = (unsigned char*)&fr;
unsigned char* ri = (unsigned char*)&fi;
for(m=0; m<4; m++) S[n*8+m] = rr[m];
for(m=0; m<4; m++) S[n*8+m+4] = ri[m];
printf ("%u\t%u\n", fr , fi);
}
free(u); free(v); free(c); free(cc);
free(pu); free(pv); free(uu); free(vv);
free(b); free(r);
}
void public_key(unsigned M1, unsigned M2 , unsigned N,
unsigned char *a, unsigned char *aa ,
unsigned char *U, unsigned char *V,
unsigned char *A){
unsigned m, n, i, j, NN = N*N;
double complex *u = calloc(NN, sizeof(double complex));
double complex *v = calloc(NN, sizeof(double complex));
double complex *pu = malloc(NN*sizeof(double complex));
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double complex *pv = malloc(NN*sizeof(double complex));
if(U[0] >= V[0]){
for(n=0; n<NN; n++){
unsigned char* x = malloc (16);
for(m=0; m <16; m++) x[m] = U[n*16+m];
pu[n] = u[n] = *(double complex*)x;
}
for(n=0; n<NN; n++){
unsigned char* x = malloc (16);
for(m=0; m <16; m++) x[m] = V[n*16+m];





unsigned char* x = malloc (16);
for(m=0; m <16; m++) x[m] = V[n*16+m];
pu[n] = u[n] = *(double complex*)x;
}
for(n=0; n<NN; n++){
unsigned char* x = malloc (16);
for(m=0; m <16; m++) x[m] = U[n*16+m];
pv[n] = v[n] = *(double complex*)x;
}
}
double complex *c = calloc(M1, sizeof(double complex));
for(n=0; n<M1; n++){
unsigned char* x = malloc (16);
for(m=0; m<16; m++) x[m] = a[n*16+m];
c[n] = *(double complex*)x;
}
double complex *cc = calloc(M2 , sizeof(double complex));
for(n=0; n<M2; n++){
unsigned char* x = malloc (16);
for(m=0; m<16; m++) x[m] = aa[n*16+m];
cc[n] = *( double complex*)x;
}
double complex *uu = calloc(NN , sizeof(double complex));
double complex *vv = calloc(NN , sizeof(double complex));
double complex *r = calloc(NN, sizeof(double complex));
for(m=0; m<M1; m++){
double norm = fnorm(NN , pu);
for(n=0; n<NN; n++) uu[n] += c[m]*pu[n]/norm;
cprod(N, pu , u, r);
for(n=0; n<NN; n++) pu[n] = r[n];
}
for(m=0; m<M2; m++){
double norm = fnorm(NN , pv);
for(n=0; n<NN; n++) vv[n] += cc[m]*pv[n]/norm;
cprod(N, pv , v, r);
for(n=0; n<NN; n++) pv[n] = r[n];
}
cprod(N, uu, vv, r);
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for(n=0; n<NN; n++){
double complex cr = r[n];
unsigned char* rr = (unsigned char*)&cr;
for(m=0; m<16; m++) A[n*16+m] = rr[m];







void matrix_public_key(unsigned N, unsigned char *U){
unsigned n, m;
for(n=0; n<N/16; n++){
double complex c = drand()*2 - 1 + I*( drand()*2 - 1);
unsigned char* array = (unsigned char*)&c;
for(m=0; m<16; m++) U[n*16+m] = array[m];
printf ("%+.16lf\t%+.16lf\n", creal(c), cimag(c));
}
}
void private_key(unsigned N, unsigned char *a){
unsigned m, n;
for(n=0; n<N/16; n++){
double complex c = drand()*2 - 1 + I*( drand()*2 - 1);
unsigned char* array = (unsigned char*)&c;
for(m=0; m<16; m++) a[n*16+m] = array[m];
printf ("%+.16lf\t%+.16lf\n", creal(c), cimag(c));
}
}
void sprint(unsigned N, unsigned char *x){
unsigned n;
for(n=0; n<N; n++){







unsigned char check_key(unsigned N, unsigned char *x, unsigned char *y){










main(int argc , char *argv[]){
// Dimension of matrices , NxN
unsigned N = 4, NN = N*N;
printf (" Dimension of matrices\n");
printf("---------------------\n");
printf ("N = %u\tNN = %u\n", N, NN);
// Length of the secret key
unsigned K = NN*8;
printf ("\nLength of the secret key\n");
printf("------------------------\n");
printf ("K = %u\n", K);
// Initialize the random number generator
srand((unsigned char) time(0) + getpid ());
// Alice: private key vectors
unsigned M1 = NN + rand()%NN, M2 = NN + rand()%NN;
unsigned char *a = malloc(M1*16);
unsigned char *aa = malloc(M2*16);
printf ("\nAlice: private key a\n");
printf("--------------------\n");
printf ("\nM1 = %d complex numbers\n", M1);
private_key(M1*16, a);
printf ("\nHex representation of a, %u bytes", M1*16);
sprint(M1*16, a);
printf ("\nAlice: private key aa\n");
printf("---------------------\n");
printf ("\nM2 = %d complex numbers\n", M2);
private_key(M2*16, aa);
printf ("\nHex representation of aa , %u bytes", M2*16);
sprint(M2*16, aa);
// Bob: private key vectors
unsigned J1 = NN + rand()%NN, J2 = NN + rand()%NN;
unsigned char *b = malloc(J1*16);
unsigned char *bb = malloc(J2*16);
printf ("\nBob: private key b\n");
printf("------------------\n");
printf ("\nJ1 = %d complex numbers\n", J1);
private_key(J1*16, b);
printf ("\nHex representation of b, %u bytes", J1*16);
sprint(J1*16, b);
printf ("\nBob: private key bb\n");
printf("-------------------\n");
printf ("\nJ2 = %d complex numbers\n", J2);
private_key(J2*16, bb);
printf ("\nHex representation of bb , %u bytes", J2*16);
sprint(J2*16, bb);
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// Alice: matrix public key
unsigned char *U = malloc(NN*16);
printf ("\nAlice: matrix public key U\n");
printf("--------------------------\n");
printf ("\nN*N = %d complex numbers\n", NN);
matrix_public_key(NN*16, U);
printf ("\nHex representation of U, %u bytes", NN*16);
sprint(NN*16, U);
// Bob: matrix public key
unsigned char *V = malloc(NN*16);
printf ("\nBob: matrix public key V\n");
printf("------------------------\n");
printf ("\nN*N = %d complex numbers\n", NN);
matrix_public_key(NN*16, V);
printf ("\nHex representation of V, %u bytes", NN*16);
sprint(NN*16, V);
// Alice: public key
unsigned char *A = malloc(NN*16);
printf ("\nAlice: public key A\n");
printf("-------------------\n");
printf ("\nN*N = %d complex numbers\n", NN);
public_key(M1 , M2 , N, a, aa , U, V, A);
printf ("\nHex representation of A, %u bytes", NN*16);
sprint(NN*16, A);
// Bob: public key
unsigned char *B = malloc(NN*16);
printf ("\nBob: public key B\n");
printf("-----------------\n");
printf ("\nN*N = %d complex numbers\n", NN);
public_key(J1 , J2 , N, b, bb , U, V, B);
printf ("\nHex representation of B, %u bytes", NN*16);
sprint(NN*16, B);
// Alice: secret key
unsigned char *Sa = malloc(K);
printf ("\nAlice: secret key Sa\n");
printf("--------------------\n");
printf ("\n2*N*N = %d unsigned integers on 4 bytes\n", 2*NN);
secret_key(M1 , M2 , N, K, a, aa , U, V, B, Sa);
printf ("\nHex representation of Sa , %u bytes", K);
sprint(K, Sa);
// Bob: secret key
unsigned char *Sb = malloc(K);
printf ("\nBob: secret key Sb\n");
printf("------------------\n");
printf ("\n2*N*N = %d unsigned integers on 4 bytes\n", 2*NN);
secret_key(J1 , J2 , N, K, b, bb , U, V, A, Sb);
printf ("\nHex representation of Sb , %u bytes", K);
sprint(K, Sb);
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// Check the secret keys
printf ("\nCheck the secret keys\n");
printf("---------------------\n");
if(check_key(K, Sa, Sb) == 0){
printf ("Result: Sa = Sb\n");
}
else{





For illustration purposes, the results obtained for one instance run are given below.
Size of matrices
----------------
N = 4 NN = 16
Length of the secret key
------------------------
K = 128
Alice: private key a
--------------------







































Alice: private key aa
---------------------




































Bob: private key b
------------------


















































Bob: private key bb
-------------------




























Alice: matrix public key U
--------------------------



























Bob: matrix public key V
------------------------


























Alice: public key A
-------------------



























Bob: public key B
-----------------


























Alice: secret key Sa
--------------------























Bob: secret key Sb
------------------






















Check the secret keys
---------------------
Result: Sa = Sb
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